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ZEALOTS, VICTIMS AND CAPTIVES: 
MAINTAINING ADEQUATE PROTECTION OF HUMAN 
SHIELDS IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 
 
By Robin Geiß* and James G. Devaney 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the wake of the Taliban capturing the city of Kunduz at the end of 
September 2015, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani gave a televised interview, 
in which he sought to reassure the population that the Afghan army would 
soon retake the city. In that interview, Ashraf Ghani highlighted the army’s 
restraint in dealing with the Taliban as a key factor in allowing the city to be 
captured, adding “[t]he problem is that the treacherous enemy is using 
civilians as human shield [sic]”.1 Not long before, in the context of the civil 
conflict raging in Syria in 2012, Human Rights Watch reported that Syrian 
government forces had repeatedly utilized human shields by forcing civilians 
to march in front of the army during arrest operations, troop movements and 
even military operations in northern Syria.2 
 
The use of human shields is prohibited in all types of armed conflict under 
both treaty and customary international law.3 The United Nations Security 
 
*  Robin Geiß holds the Chair of International Law and Security at the University of 
Glasgow. This article is based on a presentation made at the 37th San Remo Roundtable 
on International Humanitarian Law, San Remo, Italy, 2015.   
   James Devaney is a Lecturer in Law at the University of Glasgow. 
1  J. Goldstein & M. Mashal, “Afghan Crisis Grows as Push to Retake Kunduz From 
Taliban Fails”, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 2015, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/30/world/asia/afghan-forces-seek-to-regain-kunduz-
city-from-taliban.html.  
2  “Syria: Local Residents Used as Human Shields”, The Worldpost, May 26, 2012, 
available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/human-rights-watch/syria-local-residents-
use_b_1380609.html.  
3  For International Armed Conflicts see Art. 28 of the (Fourth) Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, (1949), 
and Arts. 51(7) and 58 of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I), 1977. In regard to Non-International Armed Conflicts, the second Protocol 
Additional, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 
1977, does not specifically mention the use of human shields, but see Art. 13(1) of 
Protocol II; see also “Rule 97 Human Shields”, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Customary 
International Humanitarian Law,(hereafter, “ICRC CIHL”), available at 
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Council has rightly condemned this practice as a blatant violation of 
international law.4 The legal prohibition on human shielding is crystal clear 
and undisputed. And yet, in practice, important issues remain unresolved. 
For instance, the fundamental question of when the (often unavoidable) 
collocation of military objectives among civilians and civilian installations 
can be said to amount to prohibited human shielding remains unclear. In 
other words, how exactly are we to disentangle permissible collocation from 
other prohibited forms of collocation? And perhaps more crucially, how are 
we to distinguish permissible collocation from the prohibited use of human 
shields (which remains particularly repugnant owing to fact that it seeks to 
manipulate legal protections designed to ensure that civilian lives are 
protected) in the context of an armed conflict? Moreover, the legal 
consequences of a party or person unlawfully engaging in this practice 
remain highly controversial.  
 
Human shielding is not a new or recent phenomenon, but a long-standing 
practice of warfare. It was prevalent in the American Civil War as well as in 
the Franco-Prussian war5 and was relatively widespread in World War II.6 
However, rather than being confined to the annals of history, human 
shielding remains a significant humanitarian challenge today, occurring 
regularly in a broad range of conflicts, both international and non-
international. Prominent examples of the use of human shields in recent 
years include armed conflicts in Gaza,7 Iraq,8 Afghanistan,9 Liberia,10 and 
Somalia11 among many others. 
                      
https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule97. In terms of customary 
international law see Rule 97 ICRC CIHL, ibid; see also M. J. Matheson, “Remarks: The 
United States Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 
Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Convention”, 2 Am. U. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y, 426 
(1987). 
4  See, e.g., S.C. Res. 664, U.N. Doc. S/RES/664 (1999); S.C. Res. 998, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/998 (1995); S.C. Res. 1776, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1776 (2007); S.C. Res. 1868, U.N. 
Doc. S/Red 1868 (2009); S. C. Res. 1943, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1943 (2010); and most 
recently S.C. Res. 2139, U.N. Doc. S/Res 2139 (2014). 
5  J. M. Spaight, War Rights on Land 466 (1911); W. Winthrop, 2 Mil. L. & Prec. 797 (2nd 
ed., 1920).  
6  Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (IV): 
Commentary 208 (J. Pictet, ed., 1958).  
7  M. N. Schmitt, Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law, 38 Isr. Y. B. Hum. 
Rts. […] (2008). 
8  The Secretary-General, Report: Mission to Inspect Civilian Areas in Iran and Iraq which 
May have been Subject to Military Attack, U.N. Doc. S/15834 (June 20, 1983); Letter 
from Secretary-General to the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and to the 
President of the Republic of Iraq, June 29, 1984, U.N. Doc. S/16663 (July 6, 1984). Later, 
see United Nations General Assembly Condemnation of the Iraqi Use of Human Shields 
in G.A. Res. 46/134, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/134 (1991). Subsequently see Human Rights 
Watch, Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq 67 (2003). 
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In fact, human shielding is arguably a more pressing issue today than ever 
before due to the continued erosion of any clear-cut distinction between 
civilians and the military, and the fact that traditional battlefields are 
increasingly replaced by hostilities in unclear, urban settings. Human 
shielding appears to be an endemic feature of asymmetric armed conflicts as 
militarily inferior groups desperately seek to gain a military advantage over a 
superior party to an armed conflict.12 In addition to directly endangering 
civilians, the issue of human shielding is particularly troubling from a legal 
point of view since its use turns on its head the very rationale of the 
humanitarian legal order by cynically exploiting the legal protection afforded 
to civilians under international humanitarian law.13   
 
It is against this background that this article seeks to present an analysis of 
the modern-day phenomenon of human shielding. To this end, this paper is 
divided into two main parts. Part 1 focuses on the key defining elements of 
human shielding and explores the under-researched question of how human 
shielding, a practice which is strictly prohibited by international 
humanitarian law, can be distinguished from collocation, which in times of 
war is often unavoidable and in certain forms not prohibited. Part 1, 
therefore, entails an enquiry into international humanitarian law rules on 
collocation generally before examining the more fundamental question of 
when a particular act of collocation can be said to amount to the war crime 
of human shielding.14 
 
                      
9  R. Faiez, “Claim: Taliban Used Children as Human Shields”, Associated Press, 
September 20, 2007; see also E. Gross, “Use of Civilians as Human Shields: What Legal 
and Moral Restrictions Pertain to a War Waged by a Democratic State Against 
Terrorism?” 16 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 445, 518-519 (2002). 
10  The Secretary-General, 15th Progress Report on the UNOMIL, U.N. Doc. S/1996/47, 
para. 24 (Jan. 23, 1996). 
11  Report Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of the Security Council Resolution 837 (1993) on the 
Investigation into the 5 June 1993 Attack on United Nations Forces in Somalia 
Conducted on Behalf of the UN Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/26351 (1993), Annex, 
paras. 8-9; U.N. Doc. S/26351 (1993); see also Human Rights Watch, So Much to Fear, 
at 28-29, 64-66 (2008), and Human Rights Watch, Harsh War, Harsh Peace Abuses by 
al-Shabaab, the Transitional Federal Government, and AMISOM in Somalia, at 39-40 
(2010). 
12  See, e.g., M. N. Schmitt, “Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian Law”, 
in International Humanitarian Law Facing New Challenges 11 (W. Heintschel von 
Heinegg & V. Epping, eds., 2007). 
13  To this end Roberts has included the use of human shields within the group of actions that 
can be classified as ‘lawfare’, see A. Roberts, “The Civilian in Modern War”, Y. B. Int’l 
Hum. L. 50 (2009); see also Schmitt, supra note 7 at 57. 
14  See Rule 156 of ICRC CIHL supra note 3; ICC Statute Art. 8(b)(xxiii). 
4 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
Part 2 will then consider the legal consequences that arise from human 
shielding. Particular attention will be paid to the effect that the use of human 
shields has on the obligations of the attacked party, i.e., the party illegally 
using human shields, and the (legal) protections applicable to the civilian 
population affected by this practice. A pivotal and continuously 
controversial issue in this regard is whether and under which circumstances 
human shielding amounts to direct participation in hostilities leading to a 
temporary loss of civilian protection from direct attack. The issue of direct 
participation in hostilities of human shields is now often viewed through the 
lens of the conventional distinction between voluntary and involuntary 
participation in hostilities. However, the authors argue that this is 
inadequately nuanced to be a satisfactory prism through which to assess this 
issue.  Consequently, it is crucially important to establish a more satisfactory 
means of ensuring that involuntary human shields are not deprived of the 
protection that the law affords them.  
 
II. DISENTANGLING PERMITTED COLLOCATION,  
PROHIBITED COLLOCATION AND HUMAN SHIELDING 
 
A. Permitted and Prohibited Collocation 
 
In the course of an armed conflict, some form of collocation between 
military and civilian objects and personnel is in one way or another 
inevitable. In any given conflict, the military may find itself using civilian 
infrastructure (such as roads or railways) or it may be necessary for a 
military convoy to pass through a civilian village. An oft-oft-cited example 
of collocation in this regard is the retreat of military forces down a road on 
which civilians are also fleeing hostilities.15 The laws of armed conflict take 
this reality into account. Collocation, and in fact even the use of civilian 
objects for military purposes, are not generally prohibited by the laws of 
armed conflict, notwithstanding the fact that they may have drastic legal 
consequences such as turning a civilian object into a military objective for as 
long as it is so used.16 
 
Whether a particular situation amounts to permitted or prohibited 
collocation is important not only with regard to the prior determination of 
whether a particular military objective may legally be placed in a certain 
location, but is also critical in determining the legal liability of the party 
conducting the attack, after the fact. In lieu of a general prohibition on 
collocation, international humanitarian law imposes a number of important 
legal constraints on specific forms of collocation. In particular, these 
 
15  See Schmitt, supra note 7 at 26. 
16  Art. 52(2) Additional Protocol I, supra note 3. 
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constraints derive from the obligations laid out in Article 58 of Additional 
Protocol I, as well as corresponding customary law provisions.17 Thus, while 
not prohibiting collocation per se, Article 58(b) of Additional Protocol I 
provides that parties to an armed conflict shall avoid locating military 
objectives within or near densely populated areas.18 In addition, Article 58(a) 
of Additional Protocol I imposes an obligation on parties to remove “the 
civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects” from the 
vicinity of military objectives.19  
 
There are, however, some important caveats to these stipulations. For 
instance, Article 58 Additional Protocol I specifically provides that parties to 
the conflict are only under an obligation to act as described above “to the 
maximum extent feasible”.20 Furthermore, subsection (a) provides that 
parties need only ‘endeavour’ to remove civilians and civilian objects ‘under 
their control’ from the vicinity of military objectives. It follows from the 
‘maximum extent feasible’ caveat that parties to an armed conflict are only 
required to do what can reasonably be expected of them in light of the 
prevailing circumstances. Similarly, subsection (b) of Article 58 makes 
specific reference to “densely populated” areas, imposing a higher threshold 
than merely “populated areas”.21 As a consequence, placing military 
objectives in ‘populated areas’ is not prohibited by Article 58(b) of 
Additional Protocol I. It can, however, be argued that such a form of 
collocation is comprised by Article 58(c) of Additional Protocol I, according 
to which parties to an armed conflict shall “take the other necessary 
precautions to protect the civilian population, individual civilians and 
civilian objects under their control against the dangers resulting from 
military operations”. While this latter provision is broad enough to capture 
other forms of collocation including the location of military objectives in 
populated (rather than densely populated) areas, it remains subject to the 
“maximum extent feasible” caveat, which would seem to exclude situations 
where collocation is inevitable. Moreover, Article 58(c) of Additional 
Protocol I, by virtue of the wording “take (…) precautions to protect” is 
formulated as a positive obligation. Parties to an armed conflict are therefore 
only required to do what can be expected of them under the given 
circumstances. Moreover, as NATO State parties to Additional Protocol I 
made clear at the time of ratification, the word feasible in Article 58 of 
 
17  See supra note 3. 
18  Art. 58(b) Additional Protocol I, ibid. 
19  Art. 58(a) Additional Protocol I, ibid. 
20  Art. 58 Additional Protocol I, ibid. 
21  Art. 58(b) Additional Protocol I, ibid.; see Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 
June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 2247, 2251 (C. Pilloud, Y. 
Sandoz, C. Swinarski, B. Zimmermann, eds. 1987). 
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Additional Protocol I is understood “to mean that which is practicable or 
practically possible, taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time 
including humanitarian and military considerations”;22 and this view is 
shared by others today.23 The various qualifications to Article 58 of 
Additional Protocol I respond to battlefield realities. They leave States with 
a certain (necessary) room for manoeuvre, allowing them to collocate 
military objects and personnel in civilian surroundings even for certain 
strategic reasons (“military considerations”). However, unlike collocation, 
which may be prohibited in certain (but not necessarily all) circumstances, 
human shielding is absolutely prohibited.  
 
B. Prohibited Shielding 
 
The very fact that the prohibition on the use of human shields is one which 
admits of no exception raises the question as to how to distinguish this 
phenomenon from other forms of collocation. According to Article 51(7) of 
Additional Protocol I:   
 
the presence or movements of the civilian population 
or individual civilians shall not be used to render 
certain points or areas immune from military 
operations, in particular in attempts to shield military 
objectives from attacks or to shield, favour or impede 
military operations. The Parties to the conflict shall not 
direct the movement of the civilian population or 
individual civilians in order to attempt to shield 
military objectives from attacks or to shield military 
operations.24  
 
As a result of specific textual references to the fact that certain acts must be 
deliberately carried out for a particular purpose, (specifically “to render” 
certain areas immune from military operations or “to attempt to shield” 
military objectives from attack) an element of subjectivity is introduced into 
the equation. Consequently, in order to distinguish human shielding from 
 
22  See, with some lexical variations, the declarations and reservations made by Germany 
(14/2/1991), Belgium, (20/5/1986), the United Kingdom, (2/7/2002), Canada 
(20/11/1990), Italy (27/2/1986) and the Netherlands (26/6/1987), all available at: 
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesP
arties&xp_treatySelected=470.  
23  See US Department of Defense Law of War Manual, 5.3.3.2. at 189 and 5.11 at 237 
(2015), available at: http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Law-of-War-
Manual-June-2015.pdf. 
24  See Art. 51(7) of Additional Protocol I, supra note 3 (emphasis added). 
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collocation it is a necessary exercise to show that such acts were taken 
deliberately in order to achieve this end.  
 
A number of potential options exist in this regard, including the use of a 
strict standard by which any form of collocation of civilians and military 
objectives would necessarily demonstrate that such acts were taken 
deliberately in order to shield military objectives. However, any such strict 
standard cannot be seriously considered.  In fact, the same can be said for 
any suggestion that focussing on any part of the actus reus of human 
shielding alone can be a fruitful basis on which to distinguish it from 
collocation. This is necessarily the case due to the fact that, as shown above, 
some forms of collocation are legally tolerated in certain circumstances.  
 
Accordingly, it is easy to see why the attention of most international legal 
scholars has turned to the mens rea or the intent of the party accused of 
participating in the illegal use of human shielding. It is for this reason that 
the process of establishing “specific intent” to carry out acts commensurate 
to human shielding has become the most widely accepted means of 
distinguishing between collocation and human shielding. This is the case 
despite the difficulties inherent in drawing such a distinction in armed 
conflict, especially in the context of wars in cities and other densely 
populated areas that invariably raise challenging issues such as how to take 
into account passive shielding, whereby military objectives are placed in the 
vicinity of civilian surroundings, a point to which we will return below.  
 
Before turning to examine specific intent, it should first be pointed out that 
human shielding also differs from collocation in another way, namely in that 
it specifically only relates to persons. Despite the fact that Articles 58(a) and 
58(c) of Additional Protocol I refer to the “civilian population, individual 
civilians and civilian objects”, it remains the case that the prohibition on the 
use of human shields relates solely to persons. This is the case due to the fact 
that human shielding is derived from the Third and Fourth Geneva 
Conventions, which deal with the protection of specific categories of persons 
(specifically prisoners of war and civilians).25 Similarly, Article 51(7) of 
Additional Protocol I only refers to the ‘civilian population or individual 
civilian’ and, therefore, like the corresponding war crime in Article 
8(2)(b)(xxiii) of the Rome Statute (‘civilian or protected person’) does not 
include the use of objects to shield.26 As such, it can be said that the 
customary prohibition on the use of human shields relates solely to persons, 
 
25  See Rule 97 ICRC CIHL, supra note 3. 
26  See Art. 8(2)(b)(xxiii) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 28 
U.N.T.S. 3 (1998) (the “Rome Statute”). see also W. Schabas, The International Criminal 
Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute, 250 (2010).  
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although “persons” in this context is broad enough to encompass not only 
civilians, but also other categories of protected persons such as the wounded 
and sick, or soldiers hors de combat.27 
 
This fact distinguishes the prohibition on the use of human shielding from, 
for example, the proportionality principle, which applies, mutatis mutandis, 
to both persons and civilians objects.28 This distinction derives from the 
rationale underpinning the prohibition on the use of human shields, namely 
the protection of human life specifically, and is the reason why intentionally 
endangering civilian objects by placing them in the vicinity of military 
objectives does not qualify as “shielding” but may or may not – depending 
on the circumstances – violate the provision of Article 58 of Additional 
Protocol I. 
 
C. Establishing Specific Intent to Shield 
 
Returning to the issue of specific intent, generally considered the most 
appropriate way to distinguish collocation from human shielding, the 
following subsection sets out to deal with two crucial issues. First, we will 
consider the difficulty inherent in obtaining evidence and establishing facts 
in the midst of an armed conflict, and second, the applicable evidentiary 
standard. It was noted above that the act of establishing this specific intent is 
in practice a fiendishly difficult undertaking. In an attempt to aid in this 
endeavour, it is helpful to first of all specify what acts can be said to amount 
to human shielding and in doing so to distinguish between what we term 
active and passive forms of human shielding. 
 
As a preliminary matter, it is important to clarify from the outset that 
whether or not the use of human shields is passive or active, a distinction 
explained in greater detail below, Article 51(7) of Additional Protocol 1 of 
1977 and customary international law29 outlaws both. The first sentence of 
Article 51(7) of Additional Protocol I concerns passive human shielding, 
stating that “[t]he presence or movement of the civilian population or 
individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas 
immune from military operations, in particular in attempts to shield military 
objectives from attacks or to shield, favour or impede military operations. 
[Emphasis added].”  Similarly, in relation to the active use of human shields, 
 
27  See Rule 97 of ICRC CIHL supra note 3. 
28  See Rule 14 ICRC CIHL, supra note 3. 
29  See Rule 97 of ICRC CIHL supra note 3, see also Art. 8(2)(b)(xxiii) Rome Statute, supra 
note 26, which makes clear that the prohibition on the use of human shields only applies 
when protected persons are moved to the vicinity of military operations, but also when 
such operations are moved into the vicinity of civilians; see Schabas, supra note 26. 
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the second paragraph of this provision states that “[t]he Parties to the conflict 
shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or individual 
civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to 
shield military operations. [Emphasis added].” As such, in legal terms the 
distinction between active and passive human shielding seems to be of 
marginal importance. However, in dealing with an issue in which the 
specific intent of the party (as interpreted through the mens rea element) is 
crucial, the distinction between passive and active human shielding is 
centrally important. This is, of course, due to the fact that intent is factually 
easier to establish in relation to active human shielding than passive, as we 
will see in the following subsections. 
 
1. Active Human Shielding 
 
Active human shielding refers to those situations in which a party to a 
conflict for whatever reason purposefully directs – with or without the use of 
coercion – civilians or other protected persons towards a military objective. 
A typical example often cited in this regard occurred during Operation 
Desert Storm in 1990 when Iraq captured a number of foreign citizens for 
use as human shields and placed them in various locations to protect selected 
military objectives.30 While such use of human shields where civilians are 
deliberately directed (and their protection under international humanitarian 
law is intentionally exploited) by a party to the conflict in order to protect a 
military objective is particularly blatant, it is only one form of human 
shielding. 
 
In light of these considerations, some situations inferring specific intent 
circumstantially will be straightforward in terms of evidence. If civilians are 
visibly, forcibly moved towards a military base establishing specific intent 
would not appear to present a significant challenge, especially in the absence 
of any other plausible explanation. For example, if one hundred civilians 
have been moved into the desert to surround an ammunition depot, at least 
prima facie there would appear to be no other plausible explanation as to 
why civilians should be there other than the intent to shield. Scenarios of 
active human shielding in which specific intent can be inferred 
circumstantially are perhaps unsurprisingly those which are most often 
 
30  See condemnation of UN Security Council in S.C. Res. 664, U.N. Doc. S/RES/664 
(1999); see also “1990: Outrage at Iraqi TV hostage show”, BBC Home, Aug. 23, 1990, 
available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/23/newsid_2512000/2512289.stm.  
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discussed in military manuals31 and are those that have been regularly 
condemned by the Security Council.32 
 
2. Passive Human Shielding  
 
In contrast, scenarios in which military equipment or personnel is brought 
into a civilian environment, have received much less attention. Passive 
shielding is more challenging both in legal and factual terms and occurs 
when a party to a conflict takes advantage of the pre-existing location of 
civilians in order to protect its soldiers or military equipment, i.e., when 
military material is moved into or hidden in civilian areas. In the case of the 
passive use of human shields, affected civilians may, in fact, have no 
knowledge that they are being instrumentally used in this way. For instance, 
a party may move military equipment into the grounds of a hospital or other 
populated area to seek protection from attack. This occurred, for example, in 
2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom when Iraqi soldiers regularly hid close 
to civilian houses, thereby using the occupants as shields.33 In another 
instance a party to a conflict utilised passive human shields by situating its 
forces in a refugee camp, thereby seeking to exploit the legal protections 
afforded to refugees.34 
 
What makes these scenarios so problematic in practice is that military 
equipment may be found in a civilian neighbourhood for a wide variety of 
permissible or impermissible reasons. This brings the distinction of lawful 
forms of collocation and unlawful shielding, and the difficulty of 
establishing intent, to the forefront. The mere fact that military equipment is 
located within a civilian environment does not necessarily mean that a 
specific intent to shield can be inferred circumstantially as is often the case 
in scenarios of active human shielding. In fact, there may be a number of 
reasons why military equipment is located in or moved into a civilian 
neighbourhood such as the necessity of gaining access to water or food 
 
31 See, e.g., US Department of Defense, Law of War Manual, supra note 23, sec. 5.16 at 258, 
and UK Ministry of Defense, The Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, 
sec. 5.22 at 67 (2004), available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/27874/JSP
3832004Edition.pdf.  
32  See S.C. Res. 664, U.N. Doc. S/RES/664 (1999); U.N. S.C. Res. 998, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/998 (1995); S.C. Res. 1776, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1776 (2007); S.C. Res. 1868, U.N. 
Doc. S/Red 1868 (23 March 2009); S. C. Res. 1943, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1943 (13 October 
2010) and S.C. Res. 2139, U.N. Doc. S/Res 2139 (2014). 
33  See Schmitt, supra note 7 at 19, and Human Rights Watch, supra note 8 at 67. 
34  See The Secretary-General, Report Prepared Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 
ES-10/10, U.N. Doc. A/ES-10/186 (2002).  
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supplies in the area, a retreat down the same road used by civilians, or other 
compelling strategic reasons.35  
 
Given the evidentiary difficulties in establishing specific intent to shield, 
the authors argue that an overly restrictive approach to these requirements 
cannot be justified. That, of course, is not to say that it will never be possible 
to establish specific intent to shield circumstantially in passive human 
shielding scenarios.36 For example, if hostilities are found to be occurring in 
a populated area, and military equipment is subsequently moved closer to 
those areas that are most densely populated, or military equipment is moved 
to the proximity of a civilian installation where it is known that the negative 
publicity of a future attack would be the highest, then it might be possible to 
infer specific intent to shield from these particular circumstances.  
 
Clearly, no particular evidentiary challenges arise if the intent to shield is 
officially proclaimed.37 And, indeed, the specific intent to use civilians as 
shields has been admitted on occasion; for example, by Hamas with some 
officials admitting “openly and explicitly that their intention is to use the 
civilian population in Gaza in order to shield their rockets and operatives” 
although it must be said that such practice is the exception rather than the 
rule.38 
 
Ultimately, how specific intent to shield is established remains a 
challenging issue open to interpretation. In light of this, it is more plausible 
to argue that the intent to discourage an attack (without necessarily intending 
to render the target immune in a legal sense) by maximising the civilian 
costs ought to be considered sufficient to meet the requirements of specific 
 
35  M. N. Schmitt, “Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law”, 47 Colum. J. 
Transnat’l L., 303 (2008-2009), which gives the example of Yugoslav troops transporting 
military equipment in convoys with displaced persons; see also OSCE, Kosovo/Kosova: 
As Seen, As Told: An Analysis of the Human Rights Findings of the Kosovo Verification 
Mission: Oct. 1998 to June 1999 (1999).  
36  S. Bouchié de Belle, “Chained to Canons or Wearing Targets on Their T-shirts: Human 
Shields in International Humanitarian Law”, 90 Int’l Rev. Red Cross 889, (2008). 
37  In this sense a parallel can be drawn with Art. 11 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, A/56/10 (2001), which states 
that “Conduct which is not attributable to a State under the preceding articles shall 
nevertheless be considered an act of that State under international law if and to the extent 
that the State acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question as its own.” 
38 See, e.g., statement made by Hamas’s Interior Minister, available at: 
http://in.reuters.com/article/us-palestinians-israel-idINKBN0FI0WW20140713; T. 
Kolesov Har-Oz & O. Pomson “The Use of Human Shields and International Criminal 
Law”, Guest Post, Opinio Juris, (2014), available at: 
http://opiniojuris.org/2014/08/01/guest-post-use-human-shields-international-criminal-
law/. 
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intent.39 By the same token, intent to render a military object immune from 
attack, or even the actual result of achieving legal immunity due to a 
manipulation of the proportionality principle, is not required.  
 
This result is perfectly in line with the underlying rationale of the 
prohibition of human shielding. After all, the prohibition is not merely to be 
understood as a back-up prohibition that complements the proportionality 
principle. The rationale underlying the prohibition on the use of human 
shields, quite plainly, is to ensure that civilian lives are not unnecessarily put 
in danger in the course of armed conflict irrespective of whether or not such 
a practice actually affects the proportionality assessment. The very act of 
utilizing human shields, whether in an active or passive sense, undermines 
this rationale by putting the lives of those used as shields at risk. As such, 
whether or not the intent of the party is to render a military objective legally 
immune from attack (i.e., to achieve a specific legal result) or merely to 
dissuade another party to a conflict from attacking a particular target, the 
outcome is the same — putting civilian life in danger. Therefore, the 
justification for drawing such a distinction founders.  
 
D. A Standard of Proof for Human Shielding 
 
Moreover, in relation to the standard of proof, outside a criminal court it 
would go too far to require that specific intent to shield be established 
beyond any reasonable doubt.  Instead, clear and convincing evidence of this 
specific intent will suffice to prove that a party to an armed conflict has 
engaged in the prohibited practice of human shielding. In making 
assessments on a case-by-case basis, owing to the evidentiary challenges 
associated with the establishment of specific intent, mere intent to 
discourage an attack rather than intent to render a target legally immune 
ought to be enough to prove specific intent in the sense of human shielding 
and prohibited collocation.  
 
In cases where human shielding can be shown to have occurred, important 
questions arise as to the legal consequences for the party engaging in human 
shielding, the attacker confronted with shielded military objectives as well 
as, most importantly, the civilians who are actively or passively involved in 
the shielding activity. It is these important questions which are examined 
below. 
 
III. THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN SHIELDING 
 
 
39  See US Department of Defense Law of War Manual, supra note 23 at 5.16.2, which states 
that “[t]he essence of this rule is . . . the purpose of deterring enemy military operations”.   
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Turning first to the party engaging in shielding, the legal consequences are 
relatively clear. As stated above, the use of human shields is a breach of 
international humanitarian treaty and customary international law.40 In the 
context of an international armed conflict, the other party may respond to 
such a violation of the laws of armed conflict in a classical way, namely by 
resorting to belligerent reprisals, although these are, it should be noted, 
subject to strict constraints.41 Furthermore, the individual commander 
responsible for the act of using human shields in an international armed 
conflict may be responsible for committing a war crime.42  
 
Much more important, and more challenging, is the question of whether 
and how prohibited shielding by one party to the conflict affects the other 
side’s (i.e., the attacker’s) obligations. It is almost trite to state that the legal 
consequences for the attacker go hand-in-hand with the legal consequences 
for the civilian population. If the legal obligations of the attacker were 
somehow mitigated, the legal protection of the civilian population would 
likewise be diminished. Against this background, it is important to clarify 
that the practice of human shielding in and of itself does not have any direct 
impact on the attacker’s legal obligations.  
 
On the contrary, Article 51(8) states that the protections of the civilian 
population are not to be lowered solely because one side is violating its 
obligations under the law of armed conflict.43 Consequently, the mere fact 
that one party to the conflict is utilising human shields in our view does not – 
as such – directly change anything for the attacker. Of course, the presence 
of higher numbers of civilians will factually influence the outcome of the 
proportionality assessment and may indeed tilt the balance in a way that 
would prohibit the attacker from proceeding with the attack. Human 
shielding – unless it actually amounts to a direct participation in hostilities 
on behalf of the respective individuals involved – does not diminish the legal 
protection of the civilians involved. Of course, it should be noted that the 
 
40  See supra notes 1 and 2. 
41  Although such belligerent reprisals can never be made against protected persons, see 
Rules 145 and 146 of the ICRC CIHL supra note 3 in particular; see also API Art. 52(1). 
42  See Art. 8(2)(b)(xxiii) Rome Statute, supra note 26, at Art. 58(b) Additional Protocol I; In 
Non-International Armed Conflicts, Additional Protocol II does not specifically mention 
the use of human shields; but see Art. 13(1) of Additional Protocol II, supra note 3. 
43 Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law, Adopted by the Assembly of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, 90 Int’l Comm. Red Cross 872 (2009); see also Art. 51(8) 
Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, which states that “[a]ny violation of these 
prohibitions shall not release the Parties to the conflict from their legal obligations with 
respect to the civilian population and civilians, including the obligation to take the 
precautionary measures provided for in Article 57”. 
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UK takes the view that even though involuntary human shields do not 
directly participate in hostilities “the enemy’s unlawful activity may be taken 
into account in considering whether the incidental loss or damage was 
proportionate to the military advantage expected”.44 According to this view, 
the proportionality principle remains relevant, but “if the defenders put 
civilians or civilian objects at risk …, this is a factor to be taken into account 
in favour of the attackers in considering the legality of attacks”.45 It is not 
fully clear or explained on what legal reasoning the argument in the UK 
LOAC Manual is based. The US Department of Defense Law of War 
Manual goes further, arguing that harm to human shields whose activities do 
not amount to a direct participation in hostilities “would be understood not to 
prohibit attacks under the proportionality rule”.46 The US Department of 
Defense Law of War Manual explains that “if the proportionality rule were 
interpreted to permit the use of human shields to prohibit attacks, such an 
interpretation would perversely encourage the use of human shields and 
allow violations by the defending force to increase the legal obligation on 
the attacking force.”47 The rationale underlying these views, namely that 
illegal activities should not yield any strategic advantage for the enemy, is of 
course plausible and finds support in the literature.48 The crux of human 
shielding is that it does, in fact, produce a strategic advantage49 and the 
disincentives included in the law, such as the sanctioning of human shielding 
as a war crime, only apply in international armed conflicts and may not 
always be sufficiently strong. Accordingly, closing the gap and also 
sanctioning human shielding as a war crime in non-international armed 
conflicts is certainly highly desirable.  
 
The problem is that alternative solutions often proposed typically increase 
the risk for the civilian population by lowering their legal protection, and, in 
our view, have no basis in international law as it currently stands. Customary 
international law prohibits reprisals directed against civilians and the mere 
fact that a party engaging in human shielding violates international law 
cannot justify a loss or lowering of the legal protection of the civilians 
involved.50 The UK’s reservation to Article 51 of Additional Protocol I only 
refers to cases in which “an adverse party makes serious and deliberate 
 
44  UK LOAC Manual, supra note 31, at 5.22.1. 
45  Id., at 2.7.2. 
46  US Department of Defense Law of War Manual, supra note 23, at 5.12.3.   
47  Ibid. 
48  See A. Rubinstein & Y. Ronzai, “Human Shields in Modern Armed Conflicts: The Need 
for a Proportionate Proportionality”, 22 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev., 93, 103 et seq. (2011). 
49  It should be noted, however, that reliable statistics as to how often human shielding has 
actually deterred an attack are not available.  
50  See ICRC CIHL, supra note 3, at Rule 145 et seq. with regard to reprisals. 
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attacks, … against the civilian population or civilians,”51 and therefore does 
not encompass the use of human shields. Civilians, in turn, only lose 
protection if their activity fulfils the specific criteria of direct participation in 
hostilities. While the exact interpretation of these criteria remains 
controversial, arguing that involuntary human shields who are not directly 
participating in hostilities forfeit their protection under the proportionality 
rule creates a sub-category of “directly participating in hostilities-light” and 
introduces complicated distinctions between civilians who count for 
purposes of the proportionality principle and civilians who do not, and also 
between the loss of protection from direct attack (through direct participation 
in hostilities) and the loss of protection from indirect attack (‘shielding’), 
which adds further complexity to the application of the law in practice and 
has no basis in international humanitarian law.  
 
However, there is a more indirect way in which the attacker’s obligations 
could be affected, namely if the focus is shifted from the party making use of 
human shields to the individual civilians involved in this practice with regard 
to the issue of direct participation in hostilities. In other words, when 
determining the legal obligations of the attacker, what matters is not whether 
human shielding occurs, but whether the civilians involved in the shielding 
activity are directly participating in hostilities thereby temporarily losing 
their protection from direct attack.  
 
 
 
A. Human Shields and Direct Participation in Hostilities 
 
Under Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I “civilians shall enjoy the 
protection afforded by this section unless and for such time as they take a 
direct part in hostilities.” Consequently, if the civilians who are engaging in 
human shielding were considered to be directly participating in the hostilities 
they would (temporarily) lose their protection from attack. And, indeed, 
there is, in fact, widespread agreement that shielding activities can, in 
principle, amount to direct participation in hostilities leading to a loss of 
protection.52 However, the devil, as always, is in the details.  It is highly 
controversial under what particular conditions shielding activities would 
 
51See the UK Reservation, available at: https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Notification.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId
=0A9E03F0F2EE757CC1256402003FB6D2 (emphasis added). 
52  See the general agreement on this issue acknowledged in Interpretive Guidance on the 
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law, 
supra note 43 at 1024. 
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amount to a direct participation in hostilities, and it is this issue upon which 
this portion of the article attempts to shed some light.  
 
According to the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance whether an act of human 
shielding qualifies as direct participation in hostilities depends on exactly the 
same criteria as would apply to any other activity.53 These guidelines, while 
not universally accepted without criticism,54 are crucially important at a time 
when the traditional binary distinction between combatant and civilian seems 
increasingly like an esoteric abstraction. Many modern conflicts take place 
in cities and are asymmetrical in nature – posing many problems to 
traditional international humanitarian law. As such, efforts to clarify how the 
new realities can be dealt with under the law are a necessary exercise. In 
practice, however, this is decidedly complicated and the issue of when 
human shielding activities can amount to direct participation in hostilities is 
especially controversial.55  
 
B. Voluntary and Involuntary Human Shielding: Suitable Categories to 
Establish Direct Participation in Hostilities? 
 
The debate surrounding direct participation in hostilities is well-rehearsed 
and as such it is not the aim of this article to restate what has already been 
said elsewhere. Drawing on this debate, however, it can be said that a not 
uncontroversial, but widely held position is that a distinction ought to be 
made between whether the act of human shielding was carried out 
voluntarily or involuntarily. The following subsection will set out why this 
distinction is an insufficiently sophisticated lens through which to establish 
direct participation in hostilities. 
 
As stated above, a number of commentators have argued that voluntary 
engagement in shielding activities can (and should) lead to loss of protection 
for civilians under international humanitarian law.56 For example, Schmitt 
 
53  Id..  
54  See, e.g., M. N. Schmitt, “Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The 
Constitutive Elements”, 42 N. Y. J. L. & Pol., 697 (2009-10), B. Boothby, “And for Such 
Time As’: The Time Dimension to Direct Participation in Hostilities”, 42 N. Y. J. L. & 
Pol., 741 (2009-10), W. H. Parks, “Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 770, Watkin, K. 
Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in 
Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance”, 42 N. Y. J. L. & Pol., 641 (2009-10). 
55  J. Quéguiner, “Precautions Under the Law Governing the Conduct of Hostilities”, 88 Int’l 
Rev. Red Cross 815-817 (2006).  
56  A. Rubinstein, & Y. Ronzai, supra note 48; K. Dronova, Human Shields: Standard of 
Protection Under International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law, 
LLM Thesis, Central European University, on file with the author, at 84. 
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has argued that since ‘[a] voluntary shield takes affirmative steps to frustrate 
harm to objects (or persons) that make such a contribution…he contributes 
to military action in a direct causal way; it is difficult to style his behaviour 
as anything but direct participation.’57  
 
Similarly, the Israeli Supreme Court in its ‘Targeted Killings’ judgment 
stated that: 
 
Certainly, if [human shields] are doing so because they 
were forced to do so by terrorists, those innocent 
civilians are not to be seen as taking direct part in the 
hostilities. They themselves are victims of terrorism. 
However, if they do so of their own free will, out of 
support for the terrorist organization, they should be seen 
as persons taking a direct part in hostilities.58  
 
Commentators who support this position typically distinguish voluntary 
shields from civilians who are forced to act as shields against their will and 
thus continue to enjoy immunity from attack. This is undoubtedly a plausible 
position, particularly in the abstract, as the notion of voluntary human 
shields fulfilling the constitutive criteria for a direct participation in 
hostilities by, for instance, obstructing an attack, is not in fact far-fetched. 
However, strictly speaking, this view adds a new subjective element to the 
list of objective constitutive elements that – at least according to the ICRC’s 
Interpretive Guidance – define direct participation in hostilities. Indeed, on 
the basis of these criteria – namely the threshold of harm, direct causation 
and belligerent nexus, whether an activity fulfilling these criteria occurred 
voluntarily or involuntarily, due to coercion, for example is not necessarily 
determinative. Rather, what appears to be more important is whether these 
criteria are fulfilled or not, in particular whether the shielding activity in 
question meets the relevant threshold of harm, or, in other words, whether it 
indeed adversely affects the enemy’s military capabilities. Therefore, strictly 
applied, these criteria could arguably also render a person involuntarily 
acting as a human shield as a person directly participating in hostilities.59 
 
 
57  Y. Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict, 
181-6 (3rd ed., 2016); see also Schmitt, supra note 7 at 41. 
58  HCJ 796/02, Public Committee against Torture in Israel et al. v. Government of Israel et 
al., para. 18 (2006),46 I.L.M. 375, para. 36 (2007). 
59  N. Melzer, “Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response 
to Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities” 42 Int’l L. & Pol. 831, 870 (2010). 
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Of course, one must bear in mind that the constitutive elements developed 
by the non-binding ICRC Interpretive Guidance, although they are, unlike 
the study as a whole, widely accepted and relatively uncontroversial, they 
are not written in stone. From a purely legal perspective, therefore, there is 
no compelling reason why the criteria defining direct participation in 
hostilities could not also include an additional subjective element whereby 
only voluntary acts would qualify as a direct participation in hostilities. 
However, viewed in light of the realities of modern warfare, there are a 
number of practical reasons that render any such subjective element 
impracticable.   
 
While clear-cut scenarios where the intention of a voluntary shield can be 
straightforwardly established may hypothetically be feasible, in reality (and 
in the heat of the battlefield) clear distinctions between persons shielding 
voluntarily or involuntarily are impracticable in the context of an armed 
conflict. In fact, even those who support the voluntary/involuntary 
distinction concede that this may often be the case.60 As Melzer has stated, 
while there may be extreme cases of vociferous individuals volunteering to 
act as shields or victims forced against their will, the “vast majority of 
situations involving human shields…are likely to fall into a grey-zone full of 
intricate questions no military commander or soldier should be expected to 
resolve”.61 The theoretical distinction between civilians voluntarily and 
involuntarily acting as human shields hinges entirely on the mental element 
(the mens rea of that particular individual). This state of mind would need to 
be established individually for each and every one of the civilians involved 
in the shielding activity in order to prove that a person acting as a human 
shield was doing so voluntarily and as a result could be considered to be 
directly participating in hostilities.62  
 
Furthermore, the difficulty that drawing a distinction between voluntary 
and involuntary human shielding entails is particularly manifest in situations 
where military objectives are deliberately moved into a civilian area and 
where civilians are passively manipulated (i.e., where they play no active 
part) in order for a party to the conflict to exploit the protection they enjoy 
under the law. In such scenarios, the civilian population may not even be 
aware of the fact that military equipment is being moved into their 
neighbourhood. Furthermore, even if the civilian population was fully aware 
 
60  Schmitt, supra note 7 at 27, stating that ‘[o]bviously, intent can prove difficult to identify 
in practice’; see also Quéguiner, supra note 55, at 816.  
61  Melzer, supra note 59, at 873. 
62  Id. at 44; see also Kolesov Har-Oz, & Pomson, supra note 38, stating that “[s]ince the 
actus reus of this crime is rather broad, it seems that great emphasis is placed on the mens 
rea.” 
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and if, as a result, their presence could be qualified as voluntary, the logical 
question is what they could possibly be expected to do in such 
circumstances. The civilian population may passively tolerate this activity 
and may refuse to leave their homes but it is important to emphasise that 
people are under no legal obligation to leave their homes in such 
circumstances.63 Of course, while residing in an area where a party to a 
conflict is known to conduct military operations will necessarily increase a 
civilian’s factual risk of becoming a victim of an attack, this fact in itself 
does not diminish his legal protection from attack. In the absence of such a 
duty to leave their homes it seems inconceivable that passivity could ever be 
equated with direct participation in hostilities leading to a loss of legal 
protection. 64  
 
Rather, the best way to achieve this result is to assess whether – in 
accordance with the constitutive criteria suggested in the ICRC’s Interpretive 
Guidance – a direct causal link between the presence of a civilian and 
adverse effects on the attacker’s military capabilities can be discerned, 
taking into account whether it meets the required threshold of harm (see 
below). Ultimately, in the case of civilians who refuse to leave their homes 
after military equipment has been moved into their neighbourhood, it is 
questionable whether this could ever amount to the active conduct required 
for direct participation in hostilities. In addition, it could be argued that such 
passivity amounts to an indirect causation of harm that does not qualify as 
direct participation in hostilities. 
 
Another reason why the voluntary/involuntary distinction is impracticable 
is that coercion in this context may come in different forms that may often 
not be readily apparent to an attacker or from a distance. For example, if 
family members have been taken hostage to compel an individual to act as a 
human shield or even if there is merely a threat to this effect, in practical 
terms how could an attacker ever be expected to ascertain such information? 
In addition, it is unclear where exactly (in times of war) to draw the line 
between acts that are either voluntary or involuntary, in the sense that it is 
exceedingly difficult to determine how much free will is indeed required in 
order for an individual to be considered to be acting voluntarily and how in 
 
63  See Schmitt, supra note 35 at 316, stating that ‘[w]hatever the rationale for their presence, 
it is only when they refuse to depart because they wish to complicate the enemy's actions 
that they qualify as voluntary shields.’ See also Bouchié de Belle, supra note 23 at 896-
897. 
64  J. Haas “Voluntary: Status and Protection under International Humanitarian Law” in 
International Humanitarian Law and the 21st Century’s Conflicts: Changes and 
Challenges, 191-213 (R. Arnold & P.A. Hildbrand eds., 2005); Sandoz, Swinarski, & 
Zimmermann, supra note 21. 
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practice, this fine line between voluntary and involuntary acts could be 
established and ascertained. Suggestions to work on the basis of a 
presumption of involuntary shielding may thus seem like a compromise 
solution.65 However, they can only attenuate, but not overcome, the problem 
that, in times of war, attempting to assess the mental state of people without 
the control of the actor supposed to make that distinction is simply not 
feasible. A presumption of involuntary activity that actually merits being 
labelled a ‘presumption’ could only be overcome if voluntary shielding is 
shown, i.e., only if all factors that could have rendered the activity 
involuntary can be excluded with some degree of certainty. This approach 
may work in theory, but whether such a presumption could ever realistically 
be overcome in practice is highly doubtful. Typically, and for most practical 
purposes, it seems that it would be extraordinarily difficult to find ‘reliable 
intelligence sources’66 that could exclude all factors potentially rendering the 
shielding activity involuntary and to do so within the narrow period of time 
that is typically available prior to an attack. This raises the question why 
such a presumption – possibly combined with additional warning obligations 
that would add yet further complexity to an increasingly complex targeting 
process - should be introduced in the first place.  
 
It is for these reasons that the authors argue that the distinction between 
voluntary and involuntary shielding – while not implausible as a matter of 
law - is not a sufficiently nuanced prism through which to establish direct 
participation in hostilities. The issue then becomes, naturally, what 
alternatives are open to better assess direct participation in hostilities while 
maintaining adequate protection of human shields under the law?  
 
C.  Objective Criteria as the Most Plausible Approach to Establish 
Direct Participation in Hostilities in Relation to Shielding Activities 
 
In light of the problems caused by the application of the distinction set out 
in the previous subsection, it is necessary to examine whether there are any 
practicable alternatives. In this vein, the approach of the ICRC has been to 
adhere to the three (objective) constitutive elements developed in the 
Interpretive Guidance. The issue then becomes whether these criteria – in 
particular, the required threshold of harm and the requirement of direct 
causality – are fulfilled by a given shielding activity. With respect to the 
threshold of harm the ICRC distinguishes between human shields that create 
a ‘physical obstacle to military operations of a party to the conflict’ and 
human shields that create a legal obstacle, i.e., human shields that 
 
65  Schmitt, supra note 35 at 336-337.  
66  See A. Rubinstein & Y. Ronzai, supra note 48, at 112. 
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manipulate the proportionality assessment in a way that an attack is 
prohibited due to the excessive civilian casualties it would cause.67  
 
In practice, it appears that the ICRC’s distinction between physical and 
legal barriers to an attack in relation to human shielding has not (as yet, at 
least) found widespread support.68 Nevertheless, the ICRC’s reasoning 
shows that the crucial issue is often the determination of whether and when 
shielding activity meets the required threshold of harm. Consequently, the 
decisive question with respect to the threshold of harm is whether the 
shielding activity in question ‘directly adversely affects the enemy’s 
capability’?69 It seems to us that this is the crux of the matter.  
 
However, while the criterion of a threshold of harm is undoubtedly 
convincing and plausible, it is nevertheless the case that it is in itself the 
result of an interpretive exercise (as opposed to a requirement stipulated in 
the law). In other words, the defining criteria of this threshold are not written 
in stone, but rather remain subject to interpretation. The ICRC’s approach of 
requiring a physical obstacle that objectively affects the adversary’s military 
capabilities is plausible especially because it stipulates a criterion that is 
objectively verifiable. At the same time, it sets a relatively high threshold 
and excludes shielding activities that only adversely affect the adversary’s 
willingness to attack. Of course, ascertaining whether shielding activity has 
indeed affected an adversary’s willingness to attack will often be as difficult 
(and therefore impracticable) as the task of ascertaining whether a human 
shield is acting voluntarily or involuntarily (see above).  
 
Nevertheless, it does not seem wholly implausible to argue that whenever a 
disincentive to attack is created, the relevant threshold of harm is met. In 
times of war a party to an armed conflict is required to operate swiftly and 
any obstacle – whether physical or motivational (such as fear of negative 
media coverage) – that impedes military operations could therefore be said 
to meet the (in any case undefined) threshold of harm. The problem with this 
approach, however, is that due to the practical difficulty inherent in verifying 
any such effect on the adversary’s willingness to attack, it is extremely 
difficult to draw a clear line. And if the threshold of harm is indeed set so 
low, almost any shielding activity will meet this threshold and would amount 
to a direct participation in hostilities.  
 
 
67  Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law, supra note 43 at 56. 
68  Dronova, supra note 56, at 42. 
69  See Melzer, supra note 59, at 22. 
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The paradoxical effect of such a low threshold of harm (‘adverse effects on 
the attacker’s willingness to attack’) would be that shielding would no longer 
work. In other words, if shielding is – for all intents and purposes – to be 
equated with direct participation in hostilities, it would no longer be possible 
to manipulate the proportionality principle through the use of human shields 
in the first place. Further, and perhaps more crucially, accepting that adverse 
effects on the attacker’s willingness to attack would suffice for a shielding 
activity to amount to direct participation in hostilities would – in our view – 
go too far in undermining civilian protection for the benefit of military 
considerations. In particular, it would mean that the more civilians are 
brought into the vicinity of a military objective, i.e., the more clearly the 
attacker’s willingness to attack will be adversely affected, the clearer the 
case that all such civilians would lose their protection from direct attack. 
This is clearly an undesirable outcome. 
 
It seems to us that the suggested distinction between persons acting 
voluntarily or involuntarily as human shields is an attempt to strike a more 
adequate balance between civilian and military considerations. The 
suggested distinction, as a result, upholds a low threshold of harm while also 
introducing an additional subjective threshold whereby only adverse effects 
on an attacker’s willingness to attack which were caused voluntarily would 
amount to direct participation in hostilities. Our argument is not that this 
‘package deal’ which combines a low threshold of harm with an additional 
corrective threshold necessarily leads to an unacceptable balancing of 
interests. Rather, our criticism is that by introducing two different subjective 
elements at each end of the scale— on the one hand on the attacker’s 
willingness to attack and, on the other hand, the human shield’s volition, this 
approach relies on impracticable standards that are hard – if not impossible – 
to implement under battlefield conditions. Consequently, this approach 
creates additional legal uncertainty rather than bringing clarity and should, 
therefore, in our view, be rejected.  
 
As such, we see no need to develop new and special criteria to assess 
whether human shielding amounts to a direct participation in hostilities. On 
the contrary, the assessment should indeed be based on the same criteria that 
are applied in all other circumstances in which civilian activities are 
qualified as a direct participation in hostilities. In turn this means that the 
relevant threshold of harm must necessarily be objectively established 
(including on the basis of circumstantial evidence) in order to determine 
whether a given shielding activity adversely affects the attacker’s capability 
to attack. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
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This article sought to examine the important issue of human shields – a 
phenomenon, which, as mentioned above, is arguably a more pressing issue 
today than ever before owing to the continued erosion of the distinction 
between civilian and military and the fact that traditional battlefields are 
increasingly replaced by hostilities in more complex, urban settings. This 
assessment of the use of human shields focussed in particular on a number of 
more contentious aspects of contemporary practice such as the issue of the 
relationship between permissible collocation, prohibited forms of collocation 
and the illegal use of human shields. It was shown that when determining 
whether a party to the conflict or individuals are in fact engaging in 
prohibited human shielding it is necessary to show that they had specific 
intent to shield. Under certain circumstances such intent can be inferred 
circumstantially. However, the mere fact that human shielding has occurred 
does not necessarily have any bearing on the legal protections of the 
civilians or other protected persons involved or on the legal obligations of 
the attacker. From a legal perspective, the only issue that matters in this 
regard is whether the shielding activity in question can be qualified as direct 
participation in hostilities leading to a temporary loss of protection from 
direct attack.  
 
In this regard the authors rejected approaches advocating resort to 
subjective criteria to distinguish shielding activity amounting to direct 
participation in hostilities from shielding activity which leaves the legal 
protections of the civilians involved unaffected. While the law may be 
sufficiently open so as not to preclude resort to such subjective criteria – 
namely the voluntariness of the civilian involved in shielding activity and 
adverse impact on the attacker’s willingness to attack in order to determine 
whether the requisite threshold of harm has been met – these criteria are 
extremely difficult if not impossible to ascertain under battlefield conditions. 
There may be numerous reasons why civilians are situated in the vicinity of 
military objectives (or vice versa) and their presence may affect the 
attacker’s decision to attack in an equally large number of ways. To justify 
life and death decisions in such unclear circumstances, resort must be had to 
objectively verifiable criteria. Asymmetric warfare already challenges 
international humanitarian law principles in a number of ways and any 
approach that adds further legal uncertainty is a disservice to this legal order 
and will only serve to undermine rather than strengthen it. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
